In this study, I apply spatial and temporal analysis in an effort to understand how mortgage borrowers respond to an income shock with unknown consequences and how their reactions translate into default decisions on residential mortgages. I examine whether extracting shale gas changed default probabilities of mortgages in the shale gas region after a nationwide fracking boom. Utilizing a sample of 371,946 residential mortgages that was originated in Pennsylvania between 2004 and 2011, the analysis provides compelling empirical evidence that mortgages originated in the shale gas region after the shale gas boom are associated with a 58% decrease in default probability compared to the state average default rate..
Introduction
When an exogenous force, such as a policy change or natural disaster, occurs and changes an economic environment, it also creates an opportunity to study how individuals react to an unanticipated change in wealth. To that end, several studies focused on consumption channels have found that an unanticipated change in household wealth has a significant effect on the consumption choices individuals make (see Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) , Friedman (1957) , and Souleles (1999) ). Recently, the literature has shifted to a focus on the impact of an unanticipated change in wealth on the default probability of residential mortgages, which constitute the largest debt in most households. The literature shows that income and the value of collateralized properties are two major components of household wealth that affect individuals' default decisions on their mortgages. Elul et al. (2010) , Gerardi et al. (2013) , and Mian and Sufi (2009) found that negative income shocks caused by unemployment or sickness increase the likelihood of a mortgage default. Springer and Waller (1993) , Ambrose et al. (2001) , Deng et al. (2000) , and Campbell and Dietrich (1983) found that individuals strategically default on mortgages when the value of a collateralized property drops below the outstanding mortgage balance.
The literature clearly outlines the impact of changes in household wealth on borrowers' decisions to default when the impact is negative. Yet, researchers still do not clearly understand when and how individuals respond to a change in wealth when there is uncertainty regarding whether the impact is positive or negative. In this study, I address this gap in the literature by assessing how mortgage borrowers respond to an exogenous household wealth shock with unknown consequences and by using a unique natural experiment created by a nationwide boom in extracting shale gas to do so. To be specific, I apply spatial and temporal analysis to a set of mortgages originated in Pennsylvania over the period from 2004 to 2011 to understand the impact of fracking on default. In particular, I focus on establishing whether the default probability on mortgages in regions without shale gas resources differ from the default probability on mortgages in shale gas regions after fracking became technically feasible and profitable.
Since the last quarter of 2007, over 80,000 fracking wells have been permitted and drilled in populated neighborhoods throughout the United States (Figure 1 ). According to a 2013 Wall Street Journal article, "More than 15.3 million Americans-roughly 1 out of every 20 people living in the U.S.-now live within a mile of a fracking well." 1 The increasing number of fracking activities may affect residential mortgage performance in two ways in regions exposed to shale gas exploration. On the negative side, hydraulic fracking, the technique used to release shale gas may have negative environmental consequences that, in turn, have a devastating impact on the value of collateralized properties and eventually lead to defaults triggered by an equity shock. 2 On the positive side, the onset of shale gas extraction activity creates additional income for local residents in the form of wages, 3 sign-up bonuses, and royalty payments (see Deller and Schreiber (2012) ). Since fracking shale gas became technically feasible and profitable, property owners in the shale gas region have had the option of signing fracking leases with oil and gas companies in exchange for royalty payments of typically 15% to 25% of gas production profits. As mineral rights are tied to property ownership, a borrower who defaults on a mortgage loses both the collateralized property and future royalties.
In order to prevent surface damage caused by oil and gas extraction on collateralized properties, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac established strict underwriting guidelines that prohibit financing properties located near mineral activities including fracking. For instance, Fannie Mae requires that there be "no right of surface or subsurface entry within 200 feet of a residence" (See Radow (2014) ). Although the underwriting guidelines currently used by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prohibit financing for properties engaged in oil and gas extraction, these clauses predate the fracking boom. Therefore, GSEs-at least in terms of their current regulations-may not be effective in regulating mortgage lending in the shale gas region.
The potential impact of fracking on residential mortgage default could be associated with one or both of two turning points: (1) In the fourth quarter of 2007, the combination of hydraulicfracturing and horizontal-drilling techniques made extracting shale gas highly profitable for the first time. This advance in technique marked the beginning of the nationwide fracking boom. Therefore, I
refer to the end of 2007 as the "nationwide fracking boom." (2) Given that 80,000 fracking wells did not appear overnight, it may have taken months or years for borrowers to see the first fracking well in a neighborhood. Therefore, I refer to the origination month of the first fracking permit in a zip code as the "local implementation time." After the nationwide boom in late 2007, both borrowers and lenders in the shale gas region immediately realized that the collateralized properties had become more valuable due to the shale gas resource. The nationwide fracking boom, therefore, represents an unanticipated income shock to mortgage borrowers. Further, when plans were put in place to commence fracking locally, borrowers and lenders gained additional information about exactly where a wellhead would be located, its direction, and the effect on nearby properties. This local implementation time represents an anticipated income shock because this took place after the nationwide fracking boom. To understand the temporal effect of fracking, I investigate whether mortgage borrowers made their default decisions during the nationwide fracking boom or during the local implementation time.
The mortgage dataset used in this study consists of 371,946 residential mortgages originated in Pennsylvania in the period of 2004 to 2011. 4 The Pennsylvania mortgage market is an ideal market for examining the impact of fracking activities on mortgages. As of 2015, the State of Pennsylvania permitted 18,000 fracking wells in over 27 counties ( Figure 2) . As a result, many residential neighborhoods are now exposed to shale gas exploration activities. More importantly, Pennsylvania has a long history of oil and gas extraction that goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century.
Pennsylvania's exposure to both conventional drilling and more recently to fracking allows a comparison of the effects of conventional drilling and fracking wells on mortgage default rates.
To summarize the objectives of this study, my paper extends the understanding of how individuals react to unanticipated wealth shocks through the mortgage channel. Specifically, I address four questions: (1) Does fracking affect the ex post performance of mortgages on nearby properties? (2) Do fracking wells and conventional wells differ in terms of default impact? (3) Did borrowers adjust their default decisions as soon as fracking became profitable nationwide, or did they mainly rely on local permitting information at the time of local implementation? (4) How is the impact of fracking related to the distance between properties and a fracking well?
To address these research questions, I adopt the following approaches. To identify the spatial impact of fracking activity, I categorize mortgages into two different groups based on geographic location, i.e., mortgages in a fracking region and mortgages in a non-fracking region (including conventional drilling regions) at the zip-code level. 5 The location of each wellhead is mapped to its corresponding zip code in the Geographic Information System mapping software ArcGIS in order to determine whether a conventional well or a fracking well is permitted in a neighborhood. To examine the effect of fracking on default rates, I follow Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) , , and Adelino et al. (2014) such that I observe the performance of mortgages in my sample for a 24-month period immediately following the origination date. 6 4 As most of the fracking wells are in rural neighborhoods, I excluded mortgages originated in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia from my analysis. However, the results documented in this study are the same when the full sample of 1,114,173 residential mortgages originated in Pennsylvania is used. 5 I excluded areas that are exposed to both conventional and unconventional (fracking) regions in my data in order to fully distinguish between the impact of fracking and the impact of conventional drilling. 6 I repeated the tests using a 36-month default horizon from the month of issuance. The results are very similar to those reported in this paper.
After categorizing the dataset with respect to geographic location and origination time, I investigated the impact of fracking on mortgage performance. This task was challenging because in late 2007 the Pennsylvania mortgage market underwent two changes simultaneously. First, the subprime mortgage crisis shook the entire U.S. mortgage market. Second, beginning in late 2007, the rapid surge in fracking activities transformed many previously residential areas into fracking sites.
Although these two events were independent of each other, each made a significant impact on the mortgage market, thereby increasing the complexity of my research question. To address the issue, first, I use both a difference-in-difference estimation model and an instrumental variable method to assess the impact of fracking on the default probability of mortgages originated on nearby properties before and after the shale gas boom. I find that mortgages originated in the shale gas region after the shale gas boom are associated with a 58% decrease in default probability compared to the state average default rate. Using the thickness of the shale gas as an instrumental variable, I demonstrate the causal effect of the fracking boom on the enhanced performance of mortgages in the shale gas region. The instrumental variable method quantifies the marginal impact of fracking; that is, the default probability on mortgages in a shale gas region are a 0.045 data point lower than that of mortgages in a non-shale gas region, which is equivalent to a 40-point increase in a borrower's FICO score. To investigate the dataset at its finest resolution, I compare mortgage performance including only data extracted from a 7-mile buffer zone between a fracking and a non-fracking region. The subsample analysis shows that the effect of fracking on lowering the default rate persists even at a 7-mile buffer between a fracking and a non-fracking region.
In addition to comparing mortgages originated in fracking regions with those originated in non-fracking regions, I also consider the performance difference in mortgages purchased by two kinds of investors in the fracking region only. To be specific, I compare the performance of mortgages secured by GSEs with that of mortgages secured by non-GSE investors. As noted above, GSEs impose stricter rules on investing in mortgages in the shale gas region than do non-GSE investors. Due to this difference in investment standards, a GSE-secured loan is unlikely to be available for a property located in close proximity to a fracking well. Compared to non-GSE-financed properties, GSE-financed properties are farther away from fracking wells and for this reason are less likely to be affected by fracking activity. Using a triple-difference analysis, I found that in fracking regions GSE-secured mortgages are more likely to default than non-GSE loans are. The income potential from fracking rights offers one way to account for this difference.
Given that the impact of fracking on residential mortgage default may have occurred during the nationwide fracking boom and/or during the local implementation stage, I estimate a loan-level hazard model in order to understand whether borrowers adjusted their default decisions at the time of the nationwide fracking boom or local permitting activities. My findings show that (1) borrowers stopped defaulting on mortgages after the nationwide fracking boom when extracting shale gas became technically feasible and profitable, and (2) local permitting activities do not have any additional impact on mortgage default rates. These findings are consistent with those in Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) , who suggested that whereas an unexpected change in wealth does not affect individuals' behavior. Meanwhile, an expected change in wealth affects individuals' behavior on this point.
To summarize the contribution of my study: Using natural experiment conditions created by a nationwide shale gas boom, I perform spatial and temporal analyses on the impact of fracking activity on borrowers' decisions to default on a mortgage. My findings shed light on how individuals respond to a shock with unknown consequences and on how their reactions translate into default decisions on their mortgages.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodologies used in this study. Section 3 presents the mortgage data and drilling permits data in detail. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 offers a conclusion pertaining to the contributions and limitations of this study, together with suggestions for future research directions.
Empirical Methodologies

Difference-in-Difference Estimation
Default in Shale Gas Region
Investigating the impact of fracking on mortgage performance is challenging because in late 2007 the Pennsylvania mortgage market underwent two changes simultaneously. First, the subprime mortgage crisis shook the entire U.S. mortgage market. Second, beginning in late 2007, the rapid surge in fracking activities transformed many previously residential areas into fracking sites.
As noted in the introduction section, the fracking boom and subprime crisis took place simultaneously in the fourth quarter of 2007. Therefore, I used the following difference-in-difference estimation model to examine the impact of fracking on the default probability of mortgages on nearby properties before and after the shale gas boom:
where indexes a mortgage, is the binary outcome of mortgage 24 months after its origination.
takes the value of 1 if the payment of the loan is at least 90 days late in the first 24 months after origination, and 0 otherwise. The binary variable Post2007 is set to 1 if the mortgage was originated between 2008 and 2011, and 0 otherwise. The binary indicator variable SHALE i takes the value 1 if mortgage is originated in shale gas region, defined by having at least one fracking permit issued in the same zip code in or before December 2014. is a vector of mortgage and borrower characteristics at origination, which includes information about the origination amount (LOAN_AMOUNT), the origination rate (RATE), the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), the origination loan-tovalue (LTV) ratio, the debt to income ratio (DTI), the borrower's FICO score (FICO) and whether the mortgage is fixed rate (FRM). I also include indicator variables that show whether a loan has the following characteristics: i.e., whether the loan is a refinance loan (REFI), a jumbo loan (JUMBO), a 30-year term mortgage (TERM30), a low document (LOW_DOC), and/or is covered under private mortgage insurance (PMI), and whether the loan has an LTV of exactly 80% (LTV80) 7 , a prepayment penalty (PENALTY), interest-only payments (IO), and/or a balloon payment (BALLOON) . is a vector of county indicators that remove county-level conditions that might affect the performance of all the mortgages in a county. Standard errors ε are clustered at the zip code level. If 3 is negative and significant, the implication is that mortgages financing properties in regions with shale gas resource have lower default rates after drilling for shale gas became profitable.
Default in Conventional Drilling Region
The purpose of both fracking and conventional wells is to extract gas. Therefore, after the nationwide shale gas boom, we may see difference in mortgage performance in both shale gas region and conventional drilling region. However, fracking relies on a technology to release oil and gas from geological formations that differ from those targeted by the conventional method and the environmental and economic impact differs likewise. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate between the two types of drilling and their corresponding effects on mortgage performance. A few studies document the economic and employment benefits of shale gas exploration (see Deller and Schreiber (2012) ), and another study found hydraulic fracking to be more economically viable and environmentally friendly than conventional drilling methods (see DeLeire et al. (2014) , Jenner and Lamadrid (2013) ). In addition, the majority of the mineral rights in the shale gas region belong to the 7 LTVs of 80% are more likely to have concurrent second-lien mortgages. See Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2013) .
homeowners at the beginning of the fracking era, whereas most of the mineral rights in conventional oil and gas regions were separated from landowners decades ago. I use Equation 2 to examine the potential differential default impact of conventional drilling:
where indexes an individual mortgage. is the binary outcome of an individual loan 24 months after its origination, takes the value of 1 if the payment of loan is at least 90 days late in the first 24 months after origination, and 0 otherwise. 
Instrumental Variable Method
The initial location of the wellheads might be an endogenous decision affected by regional economic and political conditions, which are correlated with the ex post mortgage default. Therefore, I also estimate the causal effect of fracking on mortgage default by means of an instrumental variable (IV) methodology to eliminate the endogeneity concern. I use the thickness of gas shale as an exogenous instrument to predict the probability of drilling in each neighborhood defined by its corresponding zip code. The thickness of shale gas has two features that make it attractive as an instrument.
(1) It directly determines the feasibility and profitability of drilling a fracking well such that it is correlated with the probability of drilling in a region. (2) The geological formation was formed millions of years ago. Therefore, shale thickness is not correlated with the ex post mortgage outcome.
Where THICKNESS i is thickness of underneath gas shale of mortgage ; are mortgage contract and borrower characteristics. The second stage regression takes the form of Equation 4.
Where FRACK ı � is the predicted fracking probability on mortgage property using equation (3).
Linear Hazard Model
In the introduction section, I explained that fracking impact on mortgage default might affect the performance of mortgages on nearby properties through multiple channels at different times. For example, as soon as drilling for shale gas became technically feasible and profitable in late 2007, borrowers and lenders in shale gas regions realized that the value of collateralized properties had increased. In addition, when a fracking permit is issued, it provides additional information about exactly where a wellhead will be located, which direction it will go, and how the nearby neighborhood will be affected.
Using Equation 3, I examine whether the issuance of a local fracking permit had additional impact on borrowers' default decisions:
where indexes a unique mortgage identification and indexes the performance month of an observation. , is the binary outcome of an individual mortgage that is assigned to 1 if a borrower is at least 90 days behind mortgage payments at the observation month t, and 0 otherwise. Post2007i is a binary variables that is set to 1 if the observation year is between 2008 and 2011, and 0 otherwise. is controlled for in the same regression.
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Model
Lastly, using Equation 6, I examine the effectiveness of GSEs in regard to reducing frackingrelated mortgage default risk:
GSE i is a binary indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is purchased by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. SHALE i is a binary indicator variable set to 1 if mortgage is originated in shale gas region, and 0 otherwise. Post2007 i × SHALE i × GSE i is the interaction term. Holding all else constant, I expect the coefficient 7 to be positive and efficient if GSEs are able to select low-risk loans mortgages using their underwriting standards.
This hypothesis was developed based on the fact that GSEs have strict underwriting guidelines that forbid oil and gas extraction on or in proximity to their securitized mortgage properties. If these guidelines are truly effective, mortgages that meet GSE underwriting guidelines should exhibit less fracking-related default risk than non-GSE mortgages do. However, these mining-related guidelines were established long before the wide application of hydraulic fracking technology and, therefore, may not be applicable in selecting low-risk loans in fracking regions.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Drilling Permits
The data pertaining to gas exploration activity were collected from the Pennsylvania matched to the mortgage data described in the following section.
Lender Processing Services Mortgage
The mortgage performance data used in the present study were obtained from Lender Processing Services (LPS). The data include detailed information on the characteristics and performance of 60% of mortgages originated in the United States, including mortgages kept in banks' portfolios, securitized by GSEs, or securitized by private institutions.
The LPS dataset provides detailed mortgage contract information at loan origination as well as monthly updates of mortgage payment information. The mortgage contract information includes a unique loan ID, origination date, term, amortization type, interest rate, loan amount, LTV, appraised value, loan type (conventional, FHA, VA, etc.), loan purpose (purchase/refinance), property type (single-family home, condo, co-op, townhouse, etc.), borrower's FICO score, and borrower characteristics. The monthly performance data include mortgage status (current, 30 days late, 60 days late, 90 days late, and default), delinquent date, default status, and default date. In this study, I
follow Adelino et al. (2014) and defined borrowers who are at least 90 days behind with their mortgage payments as being in default. I track the performance of each mortgage for the first 24 months after origination in order to reduce the effect of idiosyncratic factors on default. 9
To ensure that each mortgage in my sample had at least 24 months of performance history, I
include Across different drilling regions, on average, mortgages financing properties in conventional drilling regions have the highest FICO scores, the highest loan-to-value ratios, and the highest debtto-income ratios. For example, before the fracking boom, the average FICO score for conventionaldrilling borrowers is 633.5: 53 points higher than the state average of 580.4, whereas after the fracking boom, the average FICO score for conventional region borrowers is 697.4: 29.8 points higher than the state average of 667.6. The average origination amount for mortgages financing properties in fracking regions is lower than both the state average and the conventional-drilling region average.
Descriptive Statistics
For example, before the fracking boom, the average loan amount for the fracking region subsample is $109,835: $50,965 less than the state average ($160,800) and $12,842 less than the average of the conventional drilling region subsample ($122,677) . After the fracking boom, the average origination amount of the conventional drilling region subsample is $138,759: $50,571 lower than the state average ($189,330) and $14,677 less than the average of the conventional drilling region subsample.
On average, the mortgage interest rates (RATE) of the conventional drilling region subsample and the fracking region loans are similar, i.e., equal to the state average. This suggests that there is no across-region dispersion at the borrowing rate level. Although some differences exist when the crossregion subsamples are compared, the differences are consistent before and after the fracking boom.
This finding suggests that no fundamental change took place in regard to the lending standards in shale gas regions after the fracking boom. Column 2 shows the sample average for mortgages financing properties located in conventional drilling regions. Column 3 shows the sample average for mortgages financing properties located in shale gas regions.
From Column 1 in of subsample mortgages from different mineral extraction regions shows that before the fracking boom, mortgages in the fracking regions had the highest default rates for both the 24-month and 36-month performance horizons. However, after the fracking boom, 2.44% of fracking region mortgages defaulted within the first 24 months after origination, and 3.89% defaulted within the first 36 months after origination. Although some within-region differences exist before and after the fracking boom, the comparative relationships between the drilling regions do not change across the two subsample periods.
Results
Regional Differences in Mortgage Defaults after the Fracking Boom
In this section, I examine whether mortgages originated after the 2007 nationwide fracking announcement had a lower probability of default in the conventional drilling region or in the shale gas region. Recall that the dependent variable DEFAULT is defined as borrowers who are at least 90 days behind in their payments in the first 24 months after loan origination. Post2007 is a binary variable that is set to 1 if a mortgage was originated between 2008 and 2011. Fracking is a binary variable that is set to 1 if a mortgage is located in a zip code where there is fracking potential. CONV is a binary variable that is set to 1 if a mortgage is located in a zip code with conventional drilling wells. Table 3 presents analysis results in which both whether a mortgage was originated after 2007
and whether it is located in a conventional drilling region or shale gas region are controlled for. In unchanged even if the interaction terms are controlled for, which suggests that the decrease in default probability is in addition to the overall improvement in mortgage quality after 2007. I also repeat the exercises just outlined for Columns 1, 3, and 5 for Columns 2, 4, and 6, but this time controlling for county indicators in order to control for variations in local economic conditions and underwriting standards that may affect the performance of mortgages originated in a specific county.
Standard errors ε are clustered at the zip code level. A comparison of Columns 5 and 6 shows that the marginal effect of Post2007×SHALE and Post2007×CONV drilling remain statistically significant and the magnitudes increased. Therefore, we can conclude that our results are not driven by county-level differences.
To summarize, Table 3 shows that in Pennsylvania, compared with mortgages originated in the period of 2004 to 2007, mortgages originated after 2007 are 1.47% less likely to default. This finding is consistent with the literature, which suggests that overall mortgages showed an increase in quality after the financial crisis. In addition to showing an overall increase in mortgage quality after the financial crisis, Table 3 shows that the default rate on mortgages originated after the shale gas boom exhibit a 0.0144 decrease in data points in the shale gas region and a 0.0075 decrease in the conventional drilling regions. I explain the regional difference in mortgage performance after the fracking boom without claiming any causal effect of fracking or conventional drilling with mortgage default. Although I show that the difference in mortgage performance is not driven by county-level heterogeneity, it is possible that mortgages in the conventional drilling and fracking regions are higher quality loans lent to low risk borrowers. 12 In the remaining sections of this study, I investigate whether the lower default probabilities are driven by an increased interest in oil & gas, or differences in mortgage contracts.
Differentiating between Mortgage Default in the Fracking Region and the
Conventional Drilling Region
Although Section 4.1 shows that mortgages originated to finance properties near conventional drilling wells have a lower default rate after 2007, the summary statistics of the mortgage subsamples show that mortgages originated in the conventional drilling region and fracking region were made on average to borrowers with higher FICO scores, lower loan-to-value ratios, and lower debt-to-income ratios. Mayer et al. (2009) showed that FICO scores are negatively correlated with default, whereas loan-to-value ratio and debt-to-income ratio are positively correlated with default. In this section, I investigate whether the lower default probabilities found in the conventional drilling region and fracking region after 2007 were driven by differences in mortgage contracts and/or in borrower characteristics.
First, I discuss whether the lower default rate for mortgages originated in the shale gas region is a result of strict mortgage contracts. Table 4 Throughout the analysis, unless otherwise stated, the reported standard errors are clustered at the zip-code level.
Column 2 in Table 4 shows that mortgages originated to finance properties located in the shale gas region after the shale gas boom are less likely to default than are those originated before this period. The marginal effect of Post2007×SHALE is -0.0185 data points, which represents a 59.5%
decrease in the likelihood of default as compared to the sample mean. 13 Column 3 in Table 4 shows the estimation results from the fixed effect model to control for local variations in economic conditions and underwriting standards that affect mortgage performance in a specific county. Based on a comparison of the figures reported in Column 2 with those in Column 3, I found that controlling for county-level heterogeneity does not significantly affect the magnitude or statistical power of Post2007×SHALE in predicting default. However, the marginal effect of being in a shale gas region became statistically significant in the fixed-effect model in Column 3 (coefficient=0.0086, standard deviation=0.0043). This finding suggests that mortgages on properties located in zip codes with fracking potential exhibit default rates that are slightly higher than the state average. However, after the fracking boom, mortgages in the same region became 58.2% less likely to default compared to the state average. 14 In regard to mortgage and borrower characteristics, Table 4 shows that debt-to-income ratio (DTI), loan-to-value ratio (LTV), and origination amount ( Next, I investigate whether the lower default rate for mortgages originated in conventional drilling regions is associated with better borrower and loan characteristics. Column 2 in Table 5 shows that for mortgages originated in conventional drilling region, the Post2007×CONV indicator do not have any predictive power in regard to default rates when mortgage and borrower characteristics are controlled for in the same regression. This suggests that the decrease in the likelihood of default in the conventional drilling region after 2007 is a result of an increase in lending standards, rather than a result of drilling-related effects, or increased attention in oil & gas regions.
In Column 3, the coefficient of the conventional drilling indicator is not statistically significant in the fixed effect model, suggesting that the conventional drilling region located in counties that are with lower mortgage default rates compared to the state average. This makes sense because mining has been the oil & gas drilling industry in Pennsylvania for centuries, and as a result, counties that experienced conventional oil and gas drilling have a more robust economy than do counties that lack natural resources. 15
In regard to mortgage and borrower characteristics, the mortgage characteristic coefficients reported in Table 5 are comparable with the coefficients of the mortgage characteristics reported in Table 4 in terms of both magnitude and statistically power. Consistent with the literature, I found that FICO scores are negatively correlated with default, whereas the loan-to-value ratio, debt-toincome ratio, origination rate, and origination amount are positively correlated with default.
To summarize, Table 4 shows that mortgages originated to finance properties in the shale gas regions are associated with a significantly lower probability of default after the fracking boom compared to the state average. This difference is robust in regard to controlling for mortgage contract characteristics, borrower characteristics, and heterogeneity across counties. In contrast, Table 5 shows that mortgages originated to finance properties located in the conventional drilling regions do not exhibit any difference in regard to the probability of default when mortgage contract characteristics, borrower characteristics, and heterogeneity across counties are controlled for. This finding indicates the lowered default rate found in shale gas region is not driven by increased attention in oil & gas regions or change in mortgage borrower qualities and mortgage contract terms.
Causal Relationship between Fracking and Default
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 are based on the assumption that a decision by an oil & gas company to locate a fracking well is not correlated with ex ante mortgage default rates in a neighborhood. However, the initial location of the wellheads might be an endogenous decision affected by regional economic and political conditions, which are correlated with mortgage default.
In other words, a confounding factor may have reduced the mortgage default rate in the fracking region in late 2007, which also attracted oil and gas companies to drill in those specific neighborhoods. For example, although counterintuitive, it is possible that a neighborhood with a robust real estate market and wealthy property owners is more likely to allow shale gas exploration than is a neighborhood with a depressed real estate market where the local mortgage borrowers earn minimum wage and struggle to make ends meet. Therefore, an analysis that relies on an ex post drilling decision is most likely to produce biased results. As an alternative, therefore, I also estimate the causal effect of fracking on mortgage default by means of an instrumental variable (IV) methodology to eliminate the endogeneity concern.
I use the thickness of gas shale as an exogenous instrument to predict the probability of drilling in each neighborhood defined by its corresponding zip code. The thickness of shale gas has two features that make it attractive as an instrument. First, it directly determines the feasibility of drilling a fracking well such that it is correlated with the SHALEi indicator. Second, the geological formation was formed millions of years ago; therefore, it is not correlated with the ex post mortgage outcome. In this analysis, I employ mortgages originated after the shale gas boom. Table 6 presents the results from the IV estimation. Column 1 and Column 3 report coefficient estimates from the first-stage regression. Column 2 and Column 4 report the coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the outcome of a mortgage within the first 24 months after origination (DEFAULT24). Column 1 shows that THICKNESS is positively and significantly correlated with the decision to drill a fracking well. The Angrist-Pischke F-statistic is 27.55, suggesting that gas shale thickness is a strong instrument for SHALEi. Column 2 shows that THICKNESS is still positively and significantly correlated with the fracking indicator.
Column 2 shows that the predicted fracking probability FRACK ı � is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with default. The coefficient of FRACK ı � is -0.0127, and this is at 90% confidence interval. Column 3 and Column 4 repeat the test reported in Column 1 and Column 2 with origination year indicators. Findings of the origination year fixed effect model is comparable to results reported in Column 1 and Column 2.
To summarize, consistent with my previous findings, Table 6 shows that have shale gas resource decreases mortgage default in the shale gas region and this effect is not driven by heterogeneity across mortgages originated in different years. The IV estimate shows that the decrease in the default rates seen in the shale gas region after the fracking boom is not driven by confounding factors and, therefore, provides strong empirical evidence that fracking is a causal factor in the reduced default rates seen in the shale gas region.
Nationwide Fracking Boom vs. Local Implementation
Earlier the introduction section, I explained that fracking might affect the performance of a mortgage on a nearby property through multiple channels at different times. For example, as soon as fracking became technically feasible and profitable, borrowers in the shale gas region realized that mineral rights would a change in the value of any collateralized property. In addition, when a fracking permit is issued, it provides additional information about exactly where a wellhead will be located, which direction it will go, and how nearby neighborhoods will be affected. In this section, I examine whether the issuance of a local fracking permit had an additional impact on borrowers' default decisions after the 2007 fracking boom. Table 7 presents regression results from a loan-level linear hazard model. In this model, I
repeat the method described in section 2.3 (Equation 5) on mortgages originated before and after the shale gas boom separately. The dependent variable DEFAULT is an indicator variable defined as a borrower who is at least 90 days behind in making mortgage payments at the observation month t.
I followed the performance of each loan until default or until December 2013, the end of my study Column 1 to Column 3 present the results based on the mortgage subsample originated before the fracking boom. When these mortgages were issued, neither the borrower nor the lender expected the potential value to increase on the basis of any change in the value of mineral rights.
Column 1 present the coefficient estimates control for the fracking region indicator (SHALE), and a binary indicator variable that is set to 1 if at least 1 fracking permit has been issued in the same zip code at observation time t (After_Permit i,t ). Column 1 shows that being in the shale gas region does not affect borrowers' default decisions. However, a new fracking permit originated in the same zip code significantly decreases the probability of mortgage default by 0.000789 data points. Column 2 presents the coefficient estimates control for the observation year fixed effect, the fracking region indicator (SHALE), and an interaction term (Post2007i×SHALE i ) that is set to 1 if (1) a mortgage is in the shale gas region and (2) the observation year is between 2008 and 2013. Column 2 shows that mortgages in the shale gas region are less likely to default after the fracking boom (λ=-0.00732, σ=0.000291). In Column 3, I control for all the variables introduced in the previous two models. The results show that once Post2007×SHALE and After_Permit i,t are both controlled for in a regression, the After_Permit i,t indicator loses its predictive power whereas the predictive power of Post2007×SHALE remains both economically and statistically unchanged at 90% confidence interval (λ=-0.00101, σ=0.000713). This finding suggests that the nationwide fracking boom is more important than newly issued fracking permits at the zip code level in determining mortgage default.
Since borrowers adjusted their default decision at the nationwide fracking boom, local permitting information do not have any additional power in predicting default.
Column 4 displays the same loan-level hazard model as Column 2 but the mortgage subsample originated after the fracking boom. When these mortgages were issued, both borrowers and lenders were aware of the drilling potential. The result presented in Column 4 is consistent with my previous finding; i.e., that mortgages originated in the shale gas region after the fracking boom are associated with a lower default probability compared to that of mortgages originated in neighborhoods without fracking potential in the same period (λ =-0.00373, σ=0.000171). Further, newly issued fracking permits do not affect borrowers' decisions to default on mortgages originated after the fracking boom because borrowers have already incorporated fracking potential when they value the collateralized assets. This finding is consistent with my hypothesis that fracking boom at the state level are more important than permit issuance at the zip code level.
GSE Mortgages vs. non-GSE Mortgages in Shale Gas Region
As discussed in the introduction, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have strict underwriting guidelines that forbid oil and gas extraction on or in proximity to collateralized mortgage properties.
However, these mining-related guidelines were intended to reduce the default impact of conventional drilling and were established long before the fracking boom. Further, given the empirical evidence I have found showing that the effect of fracking on the mortgage default rate differs from that of conventional drilling, the existing guidelines may not be applicable to selecting low-risk loans in fracking regions. Table 8 shows the marginal effects estimates of GSE-securitization on mortgages default control for property location and origination period, as well as their interaction terms using the model described by Equation 6. GSE-securitization shows economically large and statistically significant power in reducing mortgage default especially for loans originated after the subprime crisis. This is consistent with the findings reported in at least two studies showing that GSEs are effective in selecting low-risk loans (see Adelino et al. (2014) , and Mayer et al. (2009) ). The coefficient of the interactions term SHALExGSE is not statistically significant. Recall that the first fracking permit in PA was originated in late 2007; however the anti-mineral-extraction provisions were not yet applicable for properties in shale gas regions. Therefore, GSE-secured mortgages are not expected to exhibit any additional default risk than do non-GSE secured mortgages in the fracking region. The marginal effect of Post2007×SHALE is -0.062, which is significant at a 95% confidence interval. The coefficient of the interactions term Post2007×SHALE×GSE is 0.0513, which is significant at a 95% confidence interval. A positive marginal effect of the triple interactions term indicates that in a fracking region, a GSE loan is more likely to default than is a non-GSE loan with the same risk characteristics.
To summarize, the results in Table 8 do not provide any evidence that GSEs have superior power in selecting loans with less fracking-related default risk. In fact, the outdated underwriting provision in regard to oil and gas extraction prohibits GSE loans from utilizing the reduced default probability associated with the new drilling technology. As a result, exposure to fracking wells increases the default probability of GSE loans by 0.0437 data points compared to mortgages secured by non-GSE investors in the same region. In addition, as the major difference between GSE loans and non-GSE loans in the fracking region is whether borrowers are allowed to sell their mineral rights, the increased default likelihood reflects magnitude of mineral rights associated with fracking.
Robustness
A Buffer Analysis on the Impact of Fracking
My investigation on the marginal effects of fracking on mortgage default demonstrates that after the fracking gas boom the mortgage default rate in the shale gas region decreased. In addition,
by comparing the performance of GSE-secured mortgages and non-GSE-secured mortgages both originated in shale gas region, I show that whether there is an option to enter a fracking lease is an important determinant of a borrowers' decisions to default on mortgage.
In this section, using mortgage subsamples extracted from a buffer zone on the border between a fracking and a non-fracking region, I gauge the importance of the right to enter a fracking lease on borrowers' default decisions. The assumption underlying this exercise is that properties located in proximity share geographic, political, and economic characteristics. When fracking activities emerge in the shale gas region, borrowers who live in proximity to the fracking region can commute and work in the shale gas region. If borrowers value the potential for employment, we should see lower mortgage default rates in neighborhoods that are within a commutable distance outside of a fracking region than in the fracking region. Therefore, I compared the default rate of mortgages in a region with shale gas resources with that in neighboring non-mineral regions (defined as Distance ≤6, 7, 10, or 15 miles). 16 I imposed the following matching algorithm to identify no-mineral zip codes that border fracking zip codes. For instance, to create the 7-mile buffer, I defined the fracking zip code indicator (Cumulative conventional drilling permit = 0); and (c) the distance between j and its nearest fracking region i is less than or equal to 7 miles (Distancej,i ≤7 miles).
After the mortgage data were selected, I investigated the impact of fracking on mortgage performance using the difference-in-difference model proposed in Section 2.1.1. The same exercise is repeated for a buffer distance less than or equal to 6 miles, a buffer distance of less than or equal to 10 miles, and a buffer distance of less than or equal to 15 miles. The number of mortgage observations did not increase beyond a 15-mile buffer bandwidth. Table 9 Panels A and B report the results from the buffer analysis method discussed in this section. Panel A Columns 1 to 3 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 6 miles. Panel A Columns 4 to 6 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 7 miles.
From Table 9 Panel A, we can see that even for properties located in proximity, the mortgage default rate in the fracking region is lower than that in non-fracking region. For example, Column 6 of Panel A shows the marginal estimate for Post2007×SHALE is -0.0128, and this coefficient is significant at a 95% confidence interval.
Panel B Columns 1 to 3 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 10 miles. Panel B Columns 4 to 6 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 15 miles. As the buffer bandwidth increases, the coefficients of the interactions term Post2007×SHALE are consistent and comparable. The findings in this section confirm findings reported in previous sections. That is, after the fracking boom, mortgages in the shale gas region show a significantly lower probability of default compared to mortgages originated in the non-shale region at the same time.
The mortgage default rate increases as we move farther away from the shale gas resource.
Conclusion
In this study, I apply spatial and temporal analysis in an effort to understand how individuals respond to an income shock with unknown consequences and how borrowers' reactions translate into default decisions on residential mortgages. I use the nationwide fracking boom that began in late show a 58% lower default probability compared to the statewide default average. The marginal impact of a mortgage in a region with shale gas resources is equivalent to a 40-point increase in a borrower's FICO score. (2) After the fracking boom, mortgages in the conventional drilling regions do not show any change in default probability. (3) The mortgage default rate in the shale gas region decreased immediately after shale gas extraction became technically feasible and profitable;
however, local permitting activities did not have any additional impact on borrowers' default decisions. (4) An analysis of mortgages located on a buffer between fracking region and non-fracking region shows that the effect of fracking on lowering the default rate persists even within a 7-mile buffer. (5) Within a fracking region, GSE-secured mortgages, which are farther away from fracking wells, are more likely to default than the non-GSE mortgages.
The importance of my study is twofold: In regard to its direct application to the fracking boom, I find no empirical evidence that fracking triggers mortgage default. As fracking wells spread across the U.S, financial regulators, banks, and real-estate investors have expressed great concern about the possible negative effect of fracking on mortgage performance. In this study, however, I found no empirical evidence to validate the concern that fracking triggers mortgage default. In addition, my analysis of the GSE anti-drilling rule shows that outdated investment standards are harmful in a rapidly changing investment environment. In light of the continued proliferation of fracking wells across the U.S, it is necessary for financial regulators, banks, and investors to understand how borrowers react to this new opportunity.
In broader terms, the literature outlines the impact of negative income change or negative equity change on mortgage default, but the discussion of changes with an uncertain outcome is limited. I address this gap in the literature by assessing how mortgage borrowers respond to an exogenous household wealth shock with unknown consequences. The fracking boom phenomenon represents a technical innovation that has the potential to transform a local economic environment. This is a new phenomenon such that its effects on the local economy are unpredictable. As a result of the fracking boom, property owners in the shale gas region were expecting both a positive (income) and a negative (equity) impact on household wealth. Data limitations prevented me from quantifying the marginal impact of income change and equity change on the default rate. Instead, I focused on the temporal and spatial difference of the aggregated fracking impact to determine how borrowers responded to the uncertainty, which made this research more feasible to a wider application. Overall, my findings provide insights based on empirical evidence into mortgage borrowers' reactions under conditions characterized by a high level of uncertainty.
Figure 1 Fracking Well Distribution in U.S using 2014 Data
Data used to create this graph is provided by DrillingInfo, a data vendor that specialize in oil and gas industry. The yellow dots represent newly issued fracking permits and the green dots represent active fracking wells.
Figure 2 Number of Drilling Permits Issued in PA by Type using 2014 Data
The data pertaining to gas exploration activity were collected from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP), which provides monthly reports on permitting and drilling activities. The yellow line shows the number of newly issued fracking (unconventional) permits and the blue line represent number of newly issued conventional drilling permits. The data pertaining to gas exploration activity were collected from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PA DEP), which provides monthly reports on permitting and drilling activities. The yellow dots represent newly issued fracking permits and the green dots represent active fracking wells. Table 1 shows information on the distribution of continuous mortgage and borrower characteristics broken down by mortgages originated before and after the fracking boom and by whether the properties are located in a shale gas region or a conventional drilling region. Panel A shows the mean and standard deviation for mortgages originated in the period of 2004 to 2011, which represent the entire sample period. Panel B and Panel C report the variable distributions of two subsamples separated by whether mortgages were originated before or after the fracking boom, respectively. Column 1 in each panel shows the average and standard deviations for mortgages financing properties in all Pennsylvania regions. Column 2 shows the average and standard deviations for mortgages financing properties located in conventional drilling regions. Column 3 shows the average and standard deviations for mortgages financing properties located in the shale gas region. Table 2 shows the average of the dichotomous variables that I use in the mortgage performance analysis. This table is also broken down by mortgages originated before the fracking boom and those originated after it and by whether the underlying properties are located in shale gas regions or conventional drilling regions. Panel A shows the averages of the indicator variables for mortgages originated in the period of 2004 to 2012, which represents the entire sample period, whereas Panel B and Panel C report the averages of the indicator variables for mortgages originated before and after the fracking boom, respectively. Column 1 in each panel represents the sample average for mortgages financing properties in all Pennsylvania regions. Column 2 shows the sample average for mortgages financing properties located in conventional drilling regions. Column 3 shows the sample average for mortgages financing properties located in shale gas regions. Table 3 presents default analysis results in which dependent variable is whether a mortgage default within 24-month after origination. In Columns 1 and 2, the analysis results reported only controlled for the Post2007 origination indicator (Post2007). Table 5 shows the regression results of Equation 2. Dependent variable is whether a mortgage defaults within 24-month after origination. Column 1 show results of the baseline regression, Column 2 includes mortgage characteristic in addition to baseline model; Column 3 includes county indicators as well. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummy variables are not displayed. Table 6 presents regressions results of the IV estimation. Column 1 and Column 3 report coefficient estimates from the first-stage regression. Column 2 and Column 4 report the coefficient estimates from the second-stage regression. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the outcome of a mortgage within the first 24 months after origination (DEFAULT24). � is the predicted fracking probability using thickness of underneath shale (THICKNESS) as an instrument. Column 1 and Column 2 report results from the general model. Column 3 and Column 4 report the origination fixed effect model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummy variables are not displayed. Column 1 to Column 3 present the results based on the mortgage subsample originated before the fracking boom. Column 1 presents the coefficient estimates control for the fracking region indicator (SHALE), and a binary indicator variable that is set to 1 if at least 1 fracking permit has been issued in the same zip code at observation time t (After_Permit i,t ). Column 2 presents the coefficient estimates control for the observation year fixed effect, the fracking region indicator (SHALE), and an interaction term (Post2007i×SHALE i ). In Column 3, I control for all the variables introduced in the previous two models. Column 4 displays the same loan-level hazard model for the mortgage subsample originated after the fracking boom. Column 4 displays coefficient estimates using the same loan-level hazard model as in Column 2 but on mortgage subsample originated after the fracking boom. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummy variables are not displayed. Table 8 shows the marginal effects estimates of GSE-securitization on mortgages default from the Difference-in-Difference-inDifference model described by Equation 6. 1. Dependent variable is whether a mortgage defaults within 24-month after origination. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummy variables are not displayed. Table 9 Panels A and B report the results from the buffer analysis method discussed in this section. Panel A Columns 1 to 3 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 6 miles. Panel A Columns 4 to 6 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 7 miles. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummy variables are not displayed. Panel B Columns 1 to 3 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 10 miles. Panel B Columns 4 to 6 report marginal effect estimates of Post2007×SHALE on the mortgage default rate using a buffer bandwidth equal to 15 miles. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dummy variables are not displayed.
